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Abstract
This paper uses contingent claims analysis to answer two questions: (i) why are some
subsidy markets apparently slow in attracting an optimal subsidy when others are not, and
(ii) what can be done about it? The lack of activity in the green investment subsidy markets
has been a concern as it appears optimal that countries should oﬀer such support from a
welfare point of view but progress has nonetheless been stalling, which motivates this paper.
We show that free riding (which is likely to aﬀect the green subsidy market) cools down
the subsidy market with harmful welfare eﬀects, and preemption (which is likely to aﬀect the
more active FDI subsidy market) overheats the subsidy market with similarly harmful eﬀects.
The theory dictates a taxation scheme that oﬀsets these eﬀects to restore the welfare to its
maximum point.
JEL numbers: D92, E62, G31, H21.
Keywords: First-mover advantages, Free riding, Investment subsidy, Preemption risk, Subsidy
tax.
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1 Introduction
Contingent claims analysis has been one of the success stories in ﬁnancial economics, and this
paper uses this technology to answer questions related to policy on promoting green technology.
Investment subsidy can correct the problem that ﬁrms fail to recognise the positive externality of
their investments, but the subsidy market itself may fail. Two questions related to this problem
are addressed. First, we ask what factors explain the activity in the subsidy markets, and second,
what role can policy play to enhance the welfare from these markets. The contingent claims
framework has the advantage that expressions for the option value of deferring subsidy decisions
can be obtained, which can be used to evaluate the eﬀects of policy in this area.
The need for policy is particularly pressing in the area of preventing climate change. The
welfare beneﬁts of combatting climate change are well documented but the positive externality
associated with green investments has so far failed to attract the kind of investment subsidy
we see in other areas such as foreign direct investment (FDI).1 The policy on climate change
has largely been a failure, and although hopes are that the recent 2015 Paris agreements can
signify a turnaround, concerns still linger about commitment and enforcement mechanisms. An
understanding of how the investment subsidy market works and how policy aﬀects this market is,
therefore, of interest.
The optimal timing of investment subsidy is a key theme in this paper. A dollar spent too soon
1Thomas (2007) estimates that within the European Union in 2005 ¿8.4bn were distributed in regional aid,
a ﬁgure that probably underestimates the actual number, and he cites estimates of between $40-50bn for the US
for 2002. An estimate by the World Trade Organization is a total of $250bn in 2003 by 21 developed countries.
Dutz and Sharma (2012) survey the green investment subsidy market and ﬁnd that subsidy is largely non-existent
globally, and essentially conﬁned to developed economies such as the US and the European Union.
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or too late in an industry cannot compete with a dollar spent at the optimal time. 2 Timing and
welfare are however not necessarily related. Just as a farmer may get the highest yield from the
latest harvest, the highest welfare may come from investment subsidy markets with low activity
levels. The fact that the green investment subsidy market has been slow to attract activity is,
therefore, not in itself a reason for policy intervention.
A factor distorting the timing of subsidy is ﬁrst-mover advantages. A subsidy oﬀered by one
country may, for instance, have negative impact on the welfare of other countries considering the
same type of subsidy which creates a ﬁrst mover advantage in the subsidy market. Rare R&D
investments are good examples. A country that attracts a rare R&D investment through subsidy
captures most of the welfare gains while the losing countries not only receive very little in welfare
eﬀects but may also have to wait for a long time for a similar opportunity to appear. In this case
the best response is to become more aggressive in the subsidy market and as a consequence the
subsidy market is heated up. Welfare is therefore sacriﬁced in order to ensure the country wins
the race to attract the investment. A second factor is free-riding eﬀects in the market for subsidy.
Here, the welfare that results from a subsidised investment is captured by other, non-subsidising,
countries. For instance, if a country is oﬀering a subsidy for green investments to combat climate
change the welfare eﬀects will be shared by all countries, including the non-subsidising ones. The
best response is to become less aggressive in the subsidy market and the subsidy market is cooled
down. Welfare is also here sacriﬁced because of the free riding eﬀect.
2This argument assumes the absence of frictions. In frictional economies it may be optimal to sacriﬁce timing
eﬃciency in order to preserve budgets for future subsidy.
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We show that the welfare distortions caused by heating and cooling of a subsidy market can
be corrected by a surprisingly simple policy intervention. This intervention takes the form of a
tax, or transfer payments, linked to a country's actual subsidy payments. The tax is negative
in the heated subsidy markets so that the non-subsidising countries receive payments calibrated
to the subsidy payments of the subsidising countries. The tax is positive in the cooled subsidy
markets so that the non-subsidising countries make payments calibrated to the subsidy payments
of the subsidising countries. This scheme makes it more attractive not to pay subsidy in the hot
subsidy markets and less attractive not to oﬀer subsidy in the cold subsidy markets. Moreover,
the scheme is incentive compatible in the sense that both the subsidising countries (who pay or
receive tax payments) and the non-subsidising ones (who do not) have the same welfare and are
therefore better oﬀ with the taxation scheme than without. Finally, the tax may be self-ﬁnancing
if the positive tax payments collected from the cold subsidy markets exactly oﬀset the negative tax
payments in the hot subsidy markets. We discuss implementation issues of such a scheme in the
main body of the paper. The current approach to policy on climate change, based on agreements
on targets, has had limited success. There is however no reason to think that targets remove the
free riding problem in the investment subsidy market, and therefore the incentive for individual
countries is to undersupply subsidy to green investments. The taxation scheme outlined in this
paper will in contrast remove the free-riding problem and therefore the decision to subsidise green
investments can be delegated to individual countries.
The related literature consists of several strands. There is a literature that discusses aspects of
subsidy design in dynamic models (see, for example, Pennings (2000, 2005), Yu, Chang and Fan
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(2007), and Asano (2010)). Our model extends this literature. There is also a strand of literature
that discusses the welfare eﬀects of FDI subsidy, surveyed in Besley and Seabright (1999). Related
contributions are Black and Hoyt (1989), Albornoz et al (2009), Chor (2009), and Fumagalli (2003).
The essential divide between their work and ours is that we use a dynamic model, allowing us to
study timing eﬀects. There is a growing literature on policy to encourage investments in green
technology, but this literature is still relatively thin (see Dutz and Sharma (2012) for an overview).
Agliardi and Sereno (2012) build a model of the optimal switch from a non-renewable source of
energy to a renewable one. They do not, however, analyse distortions to the timing of subsidy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the framework, including the earnings
process that leads to commercial value for the ﬁrm, and the welfare eﬀects of investment subsidy.
Also, we set out the impact of preemption risk and free riding eﬀects in this framework. In Section
3 we present the main theoretical ﬁndings, including the optimal form of investment subsidy, the
optimal timing of subsidy, and the eﬀects of preemption risk and free riding on the timing of
subsidy. In Section 4 we discuss the results of the model and derive its policy implications, and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Framework
In this section we set out the model. The basic framework where the ﬁrm makes an investment
under uncertainty is described in the ﬁrst subsection. A country makes a subsidy decision under
uncertainty, where the subsidy must be calibrated such that it solves the investment decision for
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the ﬁrm that receives it. The country therefore decides the timing of the subsidy. The second and
third subsections describe these problems. Finally, the fourth subsection describes ﬁrst-mover and
free-riding eﬀects that inﬂuence both decision problems.
2.1 Investment and Earnings
We outline a standard real options framework stripped down to its simplest form, where invest-
ments are equity ﬁnanced. We suppose an investment I (net of all tax implications) at time s
yields an earnings ﬂow yt, s ≤ t < ∞. The earnings are taxed at a corporate rate τ .3 The earn-
ings ﬂow yt follows a geometric Brownian motion with risk neutral drift µ and diﬀusion σ, and we
assume the ﬁrm can observe the earnings ﬂow free of cost so as to make the investment at a time
to maximize the net present value. The trigger value y∗ is the solution to this problem, where
investment is made at the optimal stopping time deﬁned as the event that the process yt = y
∗ for
the ﬁrst time. The instantaneous risk free rate is r.
The value of a claim on the earnings ﬂow yt by paying the investment cost I, at the investment
trigger point y∗, can be written as
V (yt|t < τ1) = E
[
e−r(τ1−t)
(∫ ∞
τ1
e−r(s−τ1)ys(1− τ)ds− I
)]
, (1.a)
where τ1 is the stopping time for the event that yt = y
∗ for the ﬁrst time. The value of a claim on
3Strictly speaking, taxes are not essential to the story we tell in this paper. However, tax relief is a common
ingredient of investment subsidy packages and extensively modelled in the related literature. We show in the next
section that it does not matter whether tax relief is part of the subsidy package as long as other beneﬁts make up
for it but we include taxation to be consistent with the related literature.
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the earnings ﬂow yt at the point the investment is just made is similarly
V (yt|t ≥ τ1) = E
(∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)ys(1− τ)ds
)
(1.b)
Dixit (1993) shows that
L(V (yt|t < τ1)) = 0, L(V (yt|t ≥ τ1)) + yt(1− τ) = 0, L = 1
2
σ2y2t
d2
dy2t
+ µyt
d
dyt
− rI, (2)
where L is the inﬁnitesimal operator associated with the Brownian motion governing the earnings
process yt and I is the identity operator. The solution to the ﬁrst equation is V (yt|t < τ1) =
A0y
λ1
t + B0y
λ2
t where A0, B0 are arbitrary constants, and λ1, λ2 are the positive and negative
root, respectively, of the characteristic equation 1
2
σ2λ(λ − 1) + µλ − r = 0. The roots are λ1 =(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
and λ2 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
) −√(1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
. Note that λ2 < 0 < 1 < λ1
for r > µ. The solution to the second equation is V (yt|t ≥ τ1) = A1yλ1t + B1yλ2t + yt(1−τ)r−µ ,
where again A1 and B1 are arbitrary constants. Since the solution must satisfy the homogeneity
constraint V (kyt|t ≥ τ1) = kV (yt|t ≥ τ1) the constants A1 and B1 must be zero. We impose
boundary conditions and smooth pasting conditions to identify the free parameters A0 and B0 in
the expression for the value of the investment opportunity. Using these conditions we ﬁnd the
optimal investment trigger point y∗ which is the solution of the problem of ﬁnding a smooth ﬁt
between the value of the investment opportunity V (yt|t < τ1) and the value of the investment
itself V (yt|t = τ1) − I. The investment trigger is given by y∗ = I1−τ (r − µ) λ1λ1−1 (see for example
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Dixit (1993)).
2.2 Investment Subsidy
An unsubsidised investment will be made in a country at the investment trigger y∗. Suppose a
host country is willing to oﬀer a subsidy package, denoted K, which if accepted leads to the ﬁrm
making the investment at an earlier time than otherwise would happen. We assume the value
of the subsidy package can be made dependent on the earnings level yt, K(yt). Let τ2 denote
the stopping time that the subsidy is accepted and the investment is made. The value of the
investment opportunity to a ﬁrm that accepts the subsidy is
V (yt|t < τ2, Subsidy) = E
[
e−r(τ2−t)
(∫ ∞
τ2
e−r(s−τ2)ys(1− τ)ds+ (K(yτ2)− I)
)]
. (3)
Note that in this expression we capture all value eﬀects of the investment subsidy into the value
function K. To make the acceptance decision of the ﬁrm rational, we need to impose the constraint
that the value of the subsidised investment opportunity is at least as large as the value of the
unsubsidised investment opportunity, i.e. V (yt|t < τ2, Subsidy) ≥ V (yt|t < τ1). It is not credible
that the ﬁrm would accept an investment subsidy which allowed the country oﬀering the subsidy
to extract rent from the ﬁrm. On the other hand, we expect that the subsidy is no greater than it
needs to be, so the constraint above is likely to be binding, i.e. the subsidy is the smallest subsidy
that equals the value of the unsubsidised investment opportunity.
8
2.3 Timing of Subsidy
The host country receives welfare beneﬁts from attracting the investment earlier than it otherwise
would be. The beneﬁt takes the form of a constant ﬂow w for the duration between the timing of
the subsidised investment to the time the investment would have been made in any case. Whereas
the earnings ﬂow y can be thought of as the commercial proﬁts following the investment, the
welfare ﬂow w can be thought of as the wider social externalities following the investment. For
instance, the establishment of a manufacturing plant in an area with high unemployment provides
commercial beneﬁts for the ﬁrm that makes the investment as well as social beneﬁts in terms of
lowering unemployment, maintaining skill levels of the workforce, and boosts to local businesses.
We assume y is a stochastic process but that w is constant. This is done primarily because it is
analytically diﬃcult to model two stochastic processes in the same model. However, it is natural
to assume that the social beneﬁts that arise from an investment are less risky than the commercial
beneﬁts from the same investment.
The stopping time for the event that the unsubsidised investment takes place is the event that
yt = y
∗ for the ﬁrst time. If the country seeks to attract investment early, say at the stopping time
for the event that yt = y
∗∗ < y∗ for the ﬁrst time, the country receives a constant welfare beneﬁt
ﬂow w from the latter stopping time to the former stopping time, i.e. in the time it takes for the
earnings ﬂow to go from y∗∗ to the ﬁrst instance the earnings ﬂow hits y∗. The cost of inducing
early investment is K(y∗∗), and the country will decide the optimal timing of its subsidy package
to a time that maximizes the welfare beneﬁt of receiving the welfare ﬂow w against the cost of
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inducing investment. If the country waits until yt = y
∗ the net welfare eﬀect is zero because the
value of the beneﬁt ﬂow w is zero, and because the cost of the subsidy is also here zero. If w is
suﬃciently large it is always optimal to oﬀer subsidy prior to this point in time. We can write the
welfare beneﬁt of the subsidy as
W (yt|t < τ2) = E
[
e−r(τ2−t)
(∫ τ1
τ2
e−r(s−τ2)wds−K(y∗∗)
)]
, (4.a)
where τ2 is the stopping time for the event that yt = y
∗∗ for the ﬁrst time, and τ1 is as before the
stopping time for the event that yt = y
∗ for the ﬁrst time. After a subsidy is oﬀered and accepted
at yt = y
∗∗, the welfare beneﬁts take the value
W (yt|t ≥ τ2) = E
(∫ τ1
t
e−r(s−t)wds
)
. (4.b)
These expressions satisfy the conditions
L(W (yt|t < τ2)) = 0 L(W (yt|t ≥ τ2)) + w = 0, (5)
where L is deﬁned as above. The optimal timing of subsidy is the trigger point y∗∗ which max-
imizes the welfare of the subsidy, W (yt|t < τ2). Therefore, y∗∗ is the solution to the problem
maxy∗∗W (yt|t < τ2) subject to τ2 being the stopping time for the event that yt = y∗∗ for the ﬁrst
time.
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2.4 Preemption Risk and Free-Riding
Finally, we investigate the impact of preemption risk in the market for investments, preemption
risk in the market for subsidy, and free-riding in the market for subsidy. Consider the market
for investments ﬁrst. As long as no ﬁrm has made an investment, the competition is still alive
and all ﬁrms know that it is still unclear which is the winner. At some point one ﬁrm makes the
investment, and then the winning ﬁrm becomes known and the losing ﬁrms exit the market for
the investment. Let τC be the stopping time for the event that the winning ﬁrm becomes known.
The value of the investment opportunity, conditional on it belonging to the winning ﬁrm, is
V (yt|t < τC ,Win) = E
[
e−r(τC−t)
(∫ ∞
τC
e−r(s−τC)ysds+ (K(yτC )− I)
)]
, (6.a)
and the value, conditional on it belonging to the losing ﬁrm, is
V (yt|t < τC ,Lose) = 0, (6.b)
where the right hand side is zero by the fact that the winner makes the investment destroys
the value of the investment for the loser. An example of this can be the investment in the
manufacturing of a product whose demand can be met by one ﬁrm, or the investment in the
development of a drug (which can be patented) for the cure of a certain decease. Once a ﬁrm
successfully makes the investment in such areas the investment opportunities for the losing ﬁrms
disappear. Preemption risk of this kind is studied in Lambrecht and Perraudin (2001).
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When there is preemption risk in the market for investment subsidy, the winning country
receives the welfare beneﬁt but the loser will receive nothing. Again, let τC denote the stopping
time the winning and the losing country become known and the subsidy is oﬀered. We ﬁnd that
the welfare, conditional on it belonging to the winning country, is
W (yt|t < τC ,Win) = E
[
e−r(τC−t)
(∫ τ1
τC
e−r(s−τC)wds−K(y∗∗)
)]
, (7.a)
and the welfare, conditional on it belonging to the losing country, is
W (yt|t < τC ,Lose) = 0. (7.b)
The incremental welfare of the option to attract business by giving investment subsidy will, there-
fore, vanish completely unless there is some probability that the country can win the preemption
game.
Note that the form of competition implied by preemption in the market for investments will
have a rent dissipation eﬀect in the sense that when the probability of winning the preemption
game is low the ﬁrm makes investments that have relatively low ﬁnancial value since they are
made earlier than otherwise would be the case. There is no eﬀect on the product prices or the
earnings ﬂow to the winning ﬁrm. This assumption can be made because there will only be one
winning ﬁrm in the industry after the investment is made, so there are no competitive pressures
on the product prices ex post, but only rent dissipation ex ante. The case where competition has
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an impact on product prices is one we leave for separate treatment.
We also study the eﬀect of free-riding in the market for subsidy. The welfare, conditional on it
belonging to the winning country, is given by (7.a) above as before, but the welfare, conditional
on belonging to the losing country, is
W (yt|t < τC ,Lose) = aE
[
e−r(τC−t)
(∫ τ1
τC
e−r(s−τC)wds
)]
, (7.c)
where 0 < a ≤ 1 is the fraction of the winning country's welfare that is captured by the loser. The
loser will however not have to pay the subsidy so a free-riding eﬀect arises.
3 Theoretical Results
In this section we study optimal subsidy in the framework described above. We ﬁrst look at the
problem of optimally designing a subsidy package, then at the problem of optimal timing of the
delivery of the subsidy package, and ﬁnally at the problem of identifying the factors that inﬂuence
the optimal timing.
3.1 Optimal Subsidy Packages
The ﬁrst problem addresses optimal subsidy package design (studied in, for example, Pennings
(2000, 2005) and Yu, Chang and Fan (2007)). Our analysis show key diﬀerences to this literature,
and we will spend some time highlighting these. Throughout, consider a subsidy K(yt) oﬀered
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when yt = y
∗∗. The trigger point y∗∗ is the subsidised investment trigger, and let y∗ as before
denote the unsubsidised investment trigger. First, we map the distance between y∗∗ and y∗ to
the subsidy package K(y∗∗) and its derivative K ′(y∗∗), which can be interpreted as the minimum
subsidy needed to move the investment point from y∗ to y∗∗. We ﬁnd the following result.
Lemma 1: The ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between making a subsidised investment at y∗∗ and making an
unsubsidised investment at y∗ ≥ y∗∗ when the following relationship holds,
y∗∗ =
(
y∗ −K(y∗∗)r − µ
1− τ
λ1
λ1 − 1
)(
1− r − µ
(1− τ)(λ1 − 1)K
′(y∗∗)
)−1
, (8)
where y∗ = I
1−τ (r− µ) λ1λ1−1 is the unsubsidised investment trigger. For y > y∗ a subsidy makes no
impact on the investment decision.
We notice that the subsidy compensates for early investment in two ways. The net investment
cost with a subsidised investment is I − K(y∗∗), which can be expressed as a constant 1−τ
r−µ
λ1−1
λ1
times the term in the ﬁrst bracket in (8). The lowering of the net investment cost is the ﬁrst
eﬀect. There is, however, a second eﬀect measured by the term in the second bracket of (8) since
the marginal value of the subsidy matters too. If the marginal value is zero, for instance if K is
a lump sum unaﬀected by changes to yt, then K
′(y∗∗) = 0 and the second bracket equals 1. The
investment trigger y∗∗ can be lowered further by making K ′(y∗∗) negative. This can be understood
in the context of incentivising the ﬁrm to invest earlier by oﬀering more subsidy for lower earnings
14
levels. Speeding up investment will in this case happen because the ﬁrm will avoid reducing the
subsidy by delaying acceptance. This explains Pennings (2000) suggestion that taxing FDI invest-
ments to ﬁnance an investment support package which is self-ﬁnancing at the point y∗ leads to
investment at y∗∗ < y∗. If we denote the investment support package as a lump sum ∆ > 0 and the
extra tax on the earnings of the investment as the rate δ > 0, then the value of the subsidy at yt is
K(yt) = ∆− δytr−µ , and if we calibrate the package such that ∆− δy
∗
r−µ = 0 it becomes self-ﬁnancing
at the unsubsidised investment trigger point y∗. Since the derivative is K ′(yt) = − δr−µ is negative,
however, the ﬁrm will speed up the investment such that y∗∗ < y∗. Therefore, the country re-
ceives extra tax revenues that more than exceeds the value of the investment support, an apparent
win-win situation. This argument ignores the outside options for the ﬁrm. The constraint that
V (yt|t < τ2, Subsidy) ≥ V (yt|t < τ1) implies that K(y∗) = K ′(y∗) = 0 since it is not optimal
for the ﬁrm to be charged a negative subsidy for yt > y
∗ where the investment is made anyway,
and therefore it is not credible for the country to threaten K ′(y∗) < 0. Including this constraint
determines optimal subsidy design and we ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 1: The optimal investment subsidy K(y∗∗) which leads to investment at time y∗∗
satisﬁes the ordinary diﬀerential equation
d
dyt
K(yt)− λ1
yt
K(yt) = λ1I
(
1
y∗
− 1
yt
)
. (9.a)
The solution to this problem, taking into account the boundary condition K(y∗) = d
dy
K(y∗) = 0, is
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given by
K(y∗∗) =
I
λ1 − 1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
+ I
(
1− y
∗∗
y∗
λ1
λ1 − 1
)
, (9.b)
The ODE in (9.a) is obtained from Lemma 1. Imposing the boundary condition K(y∗) =
K ′(y∗) = 0 we ﬁnd (9.b) which is the optimal subsidy. The sum K(y∗∗) +
(
y∗∗(1−τ)
r−µ − I
)
, which is
the sum of the investment and the net present value of the investment, is exactly equal to the value
of the unsubsidised investment opportunity at y∗∗. The optimal subsidy will however never give
the ﬁrm strictly more than the value of the unsubsidised investment opportunity. This constraint
is always binding with the optimal subsidy.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the optimal subsidy K(y∗∗), the net present value
of the investment NPV (y∗∗) = (1−τ)y
∗∗
r−µ − I, and the option value of the unsubsidised investment
opportunity evaluated at y∗∗, V (y∗∗). The relationship V (y∗∗) = K(y∗∗)+NPV (y∗∗) always holds.
We can look at two special cases. First, suppose the investment support is oﬀered as the
only ingredient in the subsidy package such that we can write K(yt) = ∆(yt) where ∆(yt) is a
lump sum oﬀered to the ﬁrm at the time of investment which we allow to vary with yt, so that
K ′(yt) = ∆′(yt). Similarly, suppose that the subsidy consists of tax relief only, δ(yt), where δ(yt)
is the reduction in the tax rate of the ﬁrm's earnings ﬂow the ﬁrm is entitled to over the life-
time of the investment. The eﬀect of the tax relief is lost tax revenues δ(yt)yt
r−µ over the life time
of the investment, however there is also an increase in tax revenue between yt and y
∗ where the
country is paid a tax which otherwise would not materialise. The value of this tax revenue is
τyt
r−µ − τy
∗
r−µ
(
yt
y∗
)λ1
. So in total, therefore, K(yt) =
δ(yt)yt
r−µ −
(
τyt
r−µ − τy
∗
r−µ
(
yt
y∗
)λ1)
and, by straight
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K(y∗∗), NPV (y∗∗), V (y∗∗)
y∗∗
y∗
NPV (y∗∗)
V (y∗∗)
K(y∗∗)
Figure 1: The ﬁgure shows the relationship between the optimal subsidy K(y∗∗) (solid lines), the
unsubsidised net present value of the investment NPV (y∗∗) (dashed lines), and the unsubsidised
option value of the investment opportunity V (y∗∗) (dotted lines).
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diﬀerentiation, K ′(yt) =
δ′(yt)yt
r−µ +
δ(yt)
r−µ − τr−µ
(
1− λ1
(
yt
y∗
)λ1−1)
. We can substitute the expres-
sions of K(yt) into (9.b) to obtain the optimal investment support ∆ and tax relief δ. We ﬁnd the
following result.
Corollary 1: The optimal investment support for investment at y∗∗ is given by
∆(y∗∗) =
I
λ1 − 1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
+ I
(
1− y
∗∗
y∗
λ1
λ1 − 1
)
, (10.a)
and the optimal tax relief for investment at y∗∗ is given by
δ(y∗∗) = τ
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1)
+
1− τ
λ1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1
− (1− τ)
(
1− y
∗
y∗∗
λ1 − 1
λ1
)
. (10.b)
These results are immediate from Proposition 1 and we see that both ∆ and δ (as well as their
derivatives) go towards zero if y∗∗ goes towards y∗. The key is that the restrictions on K satisfy
Proposition 1, not whether the subsidy consists of direct investment support or tax relief. This
result contrasts existing results in the literature such as Pennings (2000) and Yu et al (2007),
but these papers do not impose the boundary condition that K(y∗) = K ′(y∗) = 0. In Figure 2
we illustrate the investment choices set out in Pennings (2000). Pennings suggests that the host
country should impose an extra tax on FDI ﬁrms that will fund a package of direct investment
support, but we see that the subsidy, nor its derivative, is zero at y∗. In Figure 3 we illustrate the
investment choices in Yu et al (2007). The host country seeks to reduce the investment trigger
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Value
y
y∗
y(1−τ)
r−µ − I
−I
y(1−τ−δP1 )
r−µ − (I −∆P1 )
−I + ∆P1
A1
−I + ∆P2
y(1−τ−δP2 )
r−µ − (I −∆P2 )
A2
yP
Figure 2: The straight dashed line marked y(1−τ)
r−µ − I is the net present value of the unsubsidised
investment, and the investment trigger y∗ is the optimal timing of the investment without subsidy.
Pennings (2000) demonstrates that the host country can extract rent from the ﬁrm by oﬀering
a direct investment support (denoted ∆P1 ) at the same time as increasing the tax rate (denoted
δP1 ) without changing the optimal investment trigger point. The magnitude of the rent extraction
is A1. Also, Pennings (2000) demonstrates that the host country can extract rent by oﬀering a
contract that is self-ﬁnancing but will change the investment trigger point (denoted yP ). The
subsidy is denoted ∆P2 and δ
P
2 , and the magnitude of the rent extraction is A2.
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such that the investment decision is speeded up, and the subsidy is either in the form of a direct
investment support package worth ∆Y , or a reduction of the tax rate equal to δY . Again, we ﬁnd
that neither the subsidy, nor its derivative, is zero at y∗.
3.2 Optimal Timing
In this section we seek to derive the optimal timing of the optimal subsidy. The host country
receives a welfare beneﬁt w from the time of the investment, which is the stopping time for the
investment trigger point y∗∗ at which investment takes place at a cost K(y∗∗), to the time the
investment would have taken place anyway, y∗. We ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 2: Given the investment cost I and the unsubsidised investment trigger point y∗ the
optimal timing of the subsidy package K(y∗∗) is given by y∗∗ such that
y∗∗ = y∗max
(
0, 1− w
rI
)
. (11)
Everything else being equal, y∗∗ is closer to y∗ the greater the investment cost I and the lower the
welfare ﬂow w. The welfare at the time the subsidy is oﬀered is,
W (y∗∗) =
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗). (12)
The optimal timing of the investment subsidy can be found by evaluating the point at which the
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Value
y
y∗
y(1−τ)
r−µ − I
−I
yY
y(1−τ)
r−µ − (I −∆Y )
y(1−τ+δY )
r−µ − I
−I + ∆Y
B1
B2
Figure 3: The straight dashed line marked y(1−τ)
r−µ − I is the net present value of the unsubsidised
investment, and the investment trigger y∗ is the optimal timing of the investment without subsidy.
Yu et al (2007) show that it is cheaper to oﬀer a direct investment subsidy (denoted ∆Y ) than
a tax relief (denoted δY ) if the host country wants to reduce the investment trigger to a point
yY < y∗. Both lead to rent extraction by the ﬁrm denoted B1 and B2, respectively.
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welfare of the option to oﬀer subsidy achieves a smooth transition to the welfare of the investment.
Additional boundary conditions are found by evaluating the welfare of the subsidy option as the
earnings ﬂow is suﬃciently close to zero and here there are two possibilities: either the subsidy
trigger is zero and no smooth transition to the welfare of the investment is found, or there is no
likelihood that the subsidy trigger is reached. At the time the subsidy is made the welfare is the
expected value of the welfare ﬂow w, the ﬁrst term in (12), minus the value of the subsidy package
itself, the second term in (12).
A starting point for discussing optimal timing is the ratio w
rI
. The numerator is the welfare
ﬂow that arises from the investment and the denominator is the capital ﬂow that is necessary to
justify the investment cost I. If this ratio is greater than one the welfare ﬂow w dominates the
capital ﬂow rI so investment can be justiﬁed on welfare grounds alone even if the earnings ﬂow is
zero. In this case it is optimal to subsidise investment immediately. When the ratio is less than
one y∗∗ > 0 but always lower than the unsubsidised trigger point y∗. Therefore, as long as there is
a positive incremental welfare beneﬁt, it will always be optimal to oﬀer a subsidy package which
speeds up the investment point. The optimal subsidy is oﬀered sooner the greater the welfare ﬂow
w and later the greater the capital ﬂow rI, everything else being equal. Figure 4 illustrates the
optimal stopping time for the event that the country oﬀers the optimal subsidy to induce private
investment. The ﬁgure assumes that w < rI which implies that y∗∗ > 0.
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Value
y
y∗y∗∗
Ayλ1
w
r
(
1−
(
y
y∗
)λ1)−K(y)
Figure 4: Optimal timing of investment subsidy. The investment trigger y∗ is the unsubsidised
investment trigger, and the investment trigger y∗∗ is the optimal subsidised investment trigger.
23
3.3 Preemption Risk
Preemption risk in the market for investments arises when the event that one ﬁrm invests generates
a negative externality on the value of other ﬁrms' investment opportunities. Preemption risk in the
market for subsidy arises similarly when the event that one country subsidises investment generates
a negative externality on the value of other countries' subsidy opportunities. For instance, if
the investment being subsidised is a unique investment, then the winning ﬁrm obtains all the
beneﬁts from subsidising this investment whereas the losing ﬁrms lose the ability to subsidise
similar investment. An example of a unique investment is an investment in a large production
plant capturing economies of scale. Once the investment is made a second investment is unlikely to
follow. The ﬁrst problem is studied in Lambrecht and Perraudin (2001) and we can use their results
directly. Deﬁne F (y) as the probability that the nearest competing ﬁrm makes an investment at
yt ≤ y, F (y) = P(y∗C ≤ y∗), and deﬁne the hazard rate hF (y) = f(y)1−F (y) (f(y) is the density function
f(y) = d
dy
F (y)). The hazard rate can be interpreted such that hF (y)dy is the probability that a
ﬁrm makes the investment in the increment [y, y+dy], conditional on the event that no investment
has been made up to the point that yt = y for the ﬁrst time. Lambrecht and Perraudin (2001) show
that the unsubsidised investment trigger is y∗ = I
1−τ (r − µ) λ1−y
∗hF (y∗)
λ1−1+y∗hF (y∗) . When the hazard rate
goes to zero the unsubsidised investment trigger converges to the normal trigger I
1−τ (r − µ) λ1λ1−1 .
With preemption risk the investment trigger is lowered. Note however that Proposition 2 still
applies and the optimal subsidy will still be equal to K(y∗∗) = I
λ1−1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
+ I
(
1− y∗∗
y∗
λ1
λ1−1
)
,
only with a lower unsubsidised investment trigger y∗. We ﬁnd the following result.
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Proposition 3: Preemption risk in the market for investment lowers the unsubsidised investment
trigger point y∗ = I
1−τ (r − µ) λ1−y
∗hF (y∗)
λ1−1+y∗hF (y∗) and the optimal timing of subsidy is
y∗∗ = y∗max
(
0, 1− w
rI
)
, (13)
as before. The welfare at the investment trigger point is W (y∗∗) = w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1) − K(y∗∗),
independent of the changes to y∗ and therefore at the same level as before at the point of subsidy.
The subsidy trigger y∗∗ enters the ﬁrst term ofW (y∗∗) through the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ . However, studying
the expression of K(y∗∗) from Proposition 1, the subsidy trigger y∗∗ also enters the second term
through the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ only (see (9.b)). Proposition 3 states that a given reduction of the investment
trigger y∗ from preemption risk in the market for investment feeds through to the same lowering of
the subsidy trigger y∗∗. The ratio y
∗∗
y∗ remains, therefore, constant and the welfare is the same at
the point of subsidy. The timing of subsidy changes, however, as a consequence of the preemption
risk eﬀects. The case that w
rI
≥ 1 is in this context not very interesting since here the subsidy
trigger is always minimal at y∗∗ = 0. Therefore, we focus the discussion on the case that w
rI
< 1.
Figure 5 illustrates this result.
Although the subsidy trigger y∗∗ is lowered with preemption risk the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ remains constant.
This implies that the welfare beneﬁt and the investment subsidy, which both depend on this ratio,
are at the same level as they would be without preemption risk, at the time of optimal subsidy.
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Value
y
y∗y∗∗ y¯∗y¯∗∗
Ayλ1
w
r
(
1−
(
y
y∗
)λ1)−K(y)
A¯y¯λ1
w
r
(
1−
(
y¯
y∗
)λ1)− K¯(y¯)
Figure 5: The eﬀect of preemption risk between ﬁrms on the optimal timing of investment. We
use y∗ as the unsubsidised investment trigger, y∗∗ as the subsidy trigger, Ayλ1 as the welfare of
the option to oﬀer subsidy, and w
r
(
1−
(
y
y∗
)λ1)−K(y) as the welfare of the investment subsidy
without preemption risk (corresponding to Figure 3). We use correspondingly y¯∗, y¯∗∗, A¯y¯λ1 , and
w
r
(
1−
(
y¯
y∗
)λ1)− K¯(y¯), respectively, with preemption risk.
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However, since the subsidy is oﬀered sooner the subsidy is worth more to the country as it has to
wait for less time before harvesting the welfare beneﬁts from the subsidy. The option to oﬀer an
investment subsidy is also therefore enhanced with preemption risk.
Next consider preemption risk in the market for subsidy, and we build the analysis again
directly on Lambrecht and Perraudin (2001). Consider the probability distribution function G
deﬁned by
G(y) = P(Subsidy of nearest competing country is oﬀered at yt ≤ y). (14)
Deﬁne further y¯t = max0≤x≤t yt as the all time high of the earnings process ys up to and including
time t. If no subsidy has been oﬀered at time t, we know that the probability that the subsidy is
oﬀered at earnings levels at or lower than y¯t is zero. The conditional probability G(y|y¯t), y ≥ y¯t
is then deﬁned as
G(y|y¯t) = G(y)−G(y¯t)
1−G(y¯t) . (15)
Let y∗∗ be the trigger point for oﬀering a subsidy, and τ2 be the stopping time for the event that
yt = y
∗∗ for the ﬁrst time and τ1 the stopping time for the event that the unsubsidised investment
trigger yt = y
∗ > y∗∗ is reached for the ﬁrst time. The value of the option to oﬀer a subsidy at the
trigger point y∗∗ is then
W (yt|t ≤ τ2, y¯t) =
(
1− G(yt)−G(y¯t)
1−G(y¯t)
)
E
(∫ τ1
τ2
e−r(s+τ2)wds− e−rτ2K(y∗∗)
)
, (16)
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where the right hand side is the probability of having the winning subsidy at the trigger point y∗∗
times the welfare of the winning subsidy. The event that a competing country has the winning
subsidy leads to zero welfare. We ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 4: The optimal timing y∗∗ of an investment subsidy is given implicitly by the fol-
lowing equation.
w
r
+
y∗∗
λ1
hG(y
∗∗)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
= I
(
1− y
∗∗
y∗
)
, hG(y
∗∗) =
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗) . (17)
When there is no preemption risk in the market for subsidy, the left hand side equals w
r
and the
condition above implies Proposition 3. When the hazard rate hG(y
∗∗) > 0 is increasing in y∗∗
the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ is either zero or
y∗∗
y∗ < 1 − wrI . The welfare at the time when the subsidy is oﬀered
is W (y∗∗) = w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)−K(y∗∗) and is aﬀected by the preemption risk through the ratio y∗∗
y∗ .
The eﬀect of the preemption risk in the subsidy market is to speed up the timing of the subsidy,
and the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ is lowered relative to the level we would expect without preemption risk. This is
implied by the fact that the second term on the left hand side is positive except in the special case
where the welfare W (y∗∗) = 0. Thus the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ is lowered and the welfare W (y
∗∗) is lowered
relative to what it would be without preemption risk. Preemption risk in the market for subsidy
will therefore have a negative impact on welfare.
Proposition 2, which sets out the form of the optimal subsidy K(y∗∗), is robust to preemption
28
risk in the subsidy market in the sense that the functional form of K remains intact. However,
welfare is lowered because the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ which enters the expression for K is lowered. With
preemption risk in the market for investment the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ will in fact not change.
3.4 Free-Riding
When a country can beneﬁt not only from its own subsidised investments but also from invest-
ments subsidised by other countries a free-riding problem arises. An example is the subsidy of
investments in green technology that lower emissions of greenhouse gasses. The cost of the sub-
sidy is borne by the subsidising countries but the beneﬁts are shared by both the subsidising
and non-subsidising countries. The welfare of the winning country may be the same, but the
losing country captures a fraction of this welfare at no cost. Recall that the parameter a de-
ﬁned in (7.c) in Section 2 deﬁnes the fraction of the welfare of the winning country captured by
the losing country. The following result sets out the optimal timing of the subsidy with free-riding.
Proposition 5: The optimal timing y∗∗ of an investment subsidy is given implicitly by the fol-
lowing equation.
w
r
+
y∗∗
λ1
hG(y
∗∗)(1− a)w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− y
∗∗
λ1
hG(y
∗∗)K(y∗∗) = I
(
1− y
∗∗
y∗
)
. (18)
29
There exists a number a¯ ∈ (0, 1) deﬁned by
a¯ = 1− K(y
∗(1− w/rI))
w/r(1− (1− w/rI)λ1) (19)
For a < a¯, y∗∗ < y∗(1− w/rI), for a > a¯, y∗∗ > y∗(1− w/rI) and for a = a¯, y∗∗ = y∗(1− w/rI)
and the welfare is maximal (Proposition 3). The welfare at the time when the subsidy is oﬀered is
in either case given by W (y∗∗) = w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)−K(y∗∗).
From (18) it is immediate that when the free riding eﬀect is zero, i.e. when a = 0, y∗∗ is
determined only by preemption risk and corresponds therefore exactly to Proposition 4. What
Proposition 5 tells us is that free-riding and preemption risk have oﬀsetting eﬀects and derives the
exact cut-oﬀ point a¯ where they neutralise each other. At this point the welfare is maximal, and
the subsidy trigger point is determined by Proposition 3 (or Proposition 2 if the preemption risk
in the market for investments is zero).
4 Discussion of Findings
Our model is designed to predict the timing and welfare of investment subsidy. In this section we
derive the comparative statics of the model and discuss policy measures applied to the investment
subsidy market.
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4.1 Comparative Statics
When the subsidy trigger y∗∗ is lowered we are more likely to observe an active subsidy market.
This eﬀect can arise in two ways. First, the unsubsidised investment trigger y∗ is lowered and the
ratio of the subsidy trigger to the unsubsidised investment trigger, y
∗∗
y∗ , remains constant. Second,
the unsubsidised investment trigger y∗ remains constant and the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ is lowered. Either leads
to a more active subsidy market, but this does not imply that the welfare generated by this market
is enhanced. The welfare eﬀect is measured more correctly by evaluating the value of the option
to oﬀer subsidy at a given point in time prior to the stopping time of the event that the subsidy is
oﬀered. Welfare cannot be evaluated consistently by looking at the welfare levels at the time the
subsidy is oﬀered as everything being equal the country would prefer to receive the welfare eﬀect
sooner rather than later. In this subsection we identify the factors that inﬂuence the value of the
option to oﬀer subsidy.
Lemma 2 (Value of Option to Subsidise): Suppose yt < y
∗∗. Then the value of oﬀering
subsidy when the subsidy trigger y∗∗ is reached is Ayλ1 where
A = I1−λ1
(
1− τ
r − µ
λ1 − 1
λ1
)λ1 ( 1
λ1 − 1
(
1− w
rI
)1−λ1 − ( 1
λ1 − 1 +
w
rI
))
(20)
We ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 6 (Comparative Statics without Preemption Risk): For ﬁxed t, the value
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of the option to oﬀer subsidy at the subsidy trigger y∗∗ is increasing in the welfare ﬂow w and
decreasing in the investment cost I.
Proposition 6 demonstrates that with no preemption risk, the welfare and timing of subsidy
are one-to-one so that the activity levels in the subsidy market is a proxy for the welfare generated
by that market. Recall from Proposition 2 that the prime determinant of timing is the ratio of
the welfare to the amortised investment cost, w
rI
, with earlier subsidy the greater the ratio.4 The
value of the option to oﬀer subsidy is also increasing in the ratio w
rI
.
Next, consider preemption risk in the market for investments as described in subsection 3.3.
Recall that the probability function F (y) represents the probability that a competing ﬁrm makes
the investment at yt ≤ y, preempting the ﬁrm in question from making the investment at y.
Recall also that the hazard rate hF (y) =
f(y)
1−F (y) is the likelihood that a competing ﬁrm makes
the investment in the region [y, y + dy], conditional on not having made the investment up to the
point y. We study the impact on welfare arising from variation in the hazard rate hF . We ﬁnd
the following result.
Proposition 7 (Comparative Statics with Preemption Risk in the Market for Invest-
ments): For ﬁxed t, the value of the option to oﬀer subsidy at the subsidy trigger y∗∗ is increasing
in the level of preemption risk in the market for investments as measured by the hazard rate hF .
4Note that the ratio wrI is always less than 1 when there is a non-trivial timing issue at hand, as a ratio greater
than 1 implies that the subsidy is oﬀered for y∗∗ = 0, i.e. the subsidy is oﬀered at the ﬁrst available opportunity.
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We know already that preemption risk leads to a lowering of the unsubsidised investment
trigger and that as a result the subsidy market becomes more active because the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ remains
constant (Proposition 3). Proposition 7 shows that the activity levels in the subsidy market are
also a proxy for welfare. The intuition is that countries take advantage of the lowering of ﬁrm
proﬁts generated by the preemption risk in the investment market. This generates greater welfare
from the subsidy market because the subsidy can be made sooner (recall from Proposition 3 that
the welfare at the subsidy trigger is constant, but the timing is diﬀerent for various levels of
preemption risk).
So far, the results show a one-to-one relationship between the activity levels in the subsidy
market and the welfare generated by this market. This will no longer be the case when we consider
preemption risk and free-riding eﬀects in the market for subsidy. Recall that G(y) represents the
probability that a subsidy is oﬀered by a competing country at yt ≤ y, and that hG is the hazard
rate such that hGdy is the probability that a competing country oﬀers a subsidy in the interval
[y, y + dy] conditional on the event that no subsidy has been oﬀered when yt = y for the ﬁrst
time. We measure preemption risk in the subsidy market by the hazard rate hG. Recall also that
free-riding is measured by the parameter a which represents the fraction of the welfare captured by
the winning country in the subsidy contest that can be consumed by the loser. Ideally we would
work out the change in the value of the option to subsidise investment as a result of a change in the
hazard rate hG or the free-riding eﬀect a, but analytical results are diﬃcult to obtain. However,
there is no ambiguity about which combination of preemption risk and free-riding eﬀect is welfare
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optimal, as demonstrated in Proposition 5. Regardless of the hazard rate hG, when the free-riding
eﬀect a = a¯ (as deﬁned in Proposition 5) the welfare generated by the subsidy market is optimal.
When a 6= a¯ both a and hG matter but when a = a¯ they do not.
4.2 Policy Implications
The results in the previous section indicate that activity levels in the subsidy markets are one-to-
one with welfare except when there is preemption risk and free-riding in the market for subsidy.
In the latter case the activity levels in the subsidy market may be too high or too low, and the
question we ask here is whether there exist policy measures to correct the activity levels towards
the optimal levels. The optimal activity level is obtained for the free-riding parameter a = a¯
(as deﬁned in Proposition 5) so the search for policy measures can be narrowed down to those
that correct for the free riding eﬀect when a 6= a¯. In fact, a surprisingly simple scheme will
do this job. Consider that a 6= a¯, and also consider the situation that a country has oﬀered
an investment subsidy K(y) for yt = y. Deﬁne a tax on all non-subsidising countries equal to
bK(y) so that every time one country pays a subsidy the other countries are taxed an amount
bK(y) which goes into or out from an international fund. We derive the following result. Denote
byWS(yt) the welfare of a subsidising country and WN(yt) the welfare of a non-subsidising country.
Proposition 8 (Optimal Taxation): Assume that w
rI
< 1. Set the tax rate b such that
b =
a− a¯
1− a¯ . (21)
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Then y
∗∗
y∗ = 1− wrI and WS(yt) = WN(yt) is maximal.
The taxation scheme will therefore both remove the distortions to the optimal timing in the
investment subsidy market and make the welfare of both the subsidising and the non-subsidising
countries maximal. The intuition for Proposition 8 is straightforward. The incentive to defer the
subsidy is brought about by the fact that the non-subsidising countries can obtain a times the
welfare without incurring any of the cost of the subsidy. Therefore, if the non-subsidising countries
obtain a times the welfare of subsidy but must pay b times the subsidy of the subsidising countries
they are penalised for not oﬀering subsidy. Oﬀering subsidy is eﬀectively a way of obtaining tax-
free status. The tax is calibrated such that the countries are exactly indiﬀerent between winning
and losing the competition for subsidy. This eliminates the distortions to timing, and the welfare
of both the subsidising and non-subsidising countries is maximal. Note that the tax rate b is
positive if a ≥ a¯, which is likely to happen in cold subsidy markets, and it is negative if a < a¯,
which is likely to happen in hot subsidy markets.
The advantage of the taxation scheme outlined in Proposition 8 is that it removes the need
for international agreements regulating directly the individual country's subsidy activity. The
taxation scheme creates an alignment of the optimal subsidy activity for the individual country
with the welfare maximising subsidy activity for that country. However, there are likely to be
implementation problems, some of which we discuss here.
Uncertainty about the tax rate (the parameter b in Proposition 8): One may conceive that indi-
vidual countries may lobby for a tax rate that is in their interests, but diﬀerent from the optimal
35
tax rate set out in Proposition 8. However, if the country's objective is to maximise the welfare of
the subsidy the optimal scheme delivers this welfare level (regardless of whether the country pays
taxes or engages in subsidy activity). Any other tax rate is likely to deliver suboptimal welfare
levels. A country interested in maximising the welfare of its subsidy policy is, therefore, also likely
to lobby for the correct tax rate.
Veriﬁability issues: The most important veriﬁability issue is that of misreporting of subsidy pay-
ments. A country could hide its subsidy activity, which is alleged to be a common feature in
the FDI subsidy market currently (see Thomas (2007)). Or a country could try to classify a
non-subsidy expense as an investment subsidy. Consider two countries, A and B, where country
A reports subsidy activity KˆA and country B reports subsidy activity KˆB. If the countries are
active in two diﬀerent subsidy markets, say country A is active in subsidy market 1 and country
B in subsidy market 2, then country A should pay a tax of b2KˆB and country B should pay a tax
of b1KˆA. There is no incentive to report KˆA or KˆB incorrectly, since the eﬀect of misreporting
will only inﬂuence the other country's welfare through its tax payments. If both subsidies are
made in the same subsidy market, say market 1, then country A pays a tax b1KˆB and country B
pays a tax b1KˆA. Therefore, there is no incentive to over- or under-report subsidy as misreporting
only aﬀects the other country's welfare. Veriﬁability is not likely to be an important concern for
implementation of the taxation scheme. This conclusion would obviously change if the countries
could collude. For instance, it may be in the interest of A that KˆB was hidden as non-subsidy if
b1 is positive as this would lower the tax burden. If KˆB was truly a non-subsidy expense for B,
it would be in the interest of A that it is classiﬁed as a subsidy if b1 is negative. Therefore, the
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taxation scheme is not robust to collusion.
Funding: A cold subsidy market generates positive tax payments from countries that participate in
the scheme but are not active in the subsidy market. A hot subsidy market generates negative tax
payments to countries that are not active in the subsidy market. Therefore, if the taxation scheme
straddles both cold and hot subsidy markets the scheme could be funded without generating large
positive or negative balances. There is however no guarantee that the scheme will not do so over
time. If surplus cash need to be distributed or raised from the scheme's members it is necessary
that this is done such as not to distort the member countries' future subsidy activity.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the optimal timing and welfare of investment subsidy and their determining
factors. We ﬁnd that preemption risk and free-riding in the subsidy market can create hot and cold
subsidy markets, both of which are harmful to welfare and requires correction. We demonstrate
that a policy scheme can eliminate this problem: simply transfer money (negative tax) for non-
subsidy in the hot subsidy markets and charge a tax for non-subsidy in the cold subsidy markets. If
the tax is calibrated properly it will make the activity in the market for subsidy robust against pre-
emption risk and free-riding eﬀects, and participation is therefore incentive compatible. Obtaining
international agreement for such a scheme may be easier than obtaining international agreements
about targets and quotas, which currently is the dominant policy measure aimed at making the
subsidy market for green investments more active. The taxation scheme outlined in this paper has
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the beneﬁt that it allows costless delegation of the decision to oﬀering the welfare optimal subsidy
to the individual country, whereas targets and quotas require a credible commitment device.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: The ﬁrm regards the subsidy package as just another investment or borrowing opportunity, the
net present value of which can be maximized by optimal timing. The investment opportunity (prior to investment)
takes values that can be expressed as Ayλ1t for some constant A and the net present value of the investment (at
39
the point of investment) including the value of subsidy package is
(
yt(1− τ)
r − µ − I
)
+K(yt). (A.1)
The ﬁrm decides on the optimal timing when the value of the investment opportunity equals the net present value
of investment, and when there is a smooth ﬁt at the investment trigger point. This yields two equations that
determine the optimal investment trigger point y∗∗ and the free constant A. The conditions are as follows,
Ay∗∗λ1 =
(
y∗∗(1− τ)
r − µ − I
)
+K(y∗∗), (Value matching VM)
λ1Ay
∗∗λ1−1 =
1− τ
r − µ +
d
dyt
K(y∗∗), (Smooth pasting SP)
Ay∗∗λ1 =
1
λ1
y∗∗(1− τ)
r − µ +
y∗∗
λ1
d
dyt
K(y∗∗), (Rearranging SP)
(
y∗∗(1− τ)
r − µ − I
)
+K(y∗∗) =
1
λ1
y∗∗(1− τ)
r − µ +
y∗∗
λ1
d
dyt
K(y∗∗), (Combining VM, SP)
y∗∗
(
1− 1
λ1
)
= I
I
1− τ (r − µ)−
K(y∗∗)(r − µ)
1− τ +
r − µ
1− τ
y∗∗
λ1
d
dyt
K(y∗∗), (Rearranging)
y∗∗
(
λ1 − 1
λ1
− r − µ
1− τ
1
λ1
d
dy
K(y∗∗)
)
= y∗
λ1 − 1
λ1
− K(y
∗∗)(r − µ)
1− τ , (Using deﬁnition of y
∗)
y∗∗ =
(
y∗ − K(y
∗∗)(r − µ)
1− τ
λ1
λ1 − 1
)(
1− r − µ
1− τ
1
λ1 − 1
d
dy
K(y∗∗)
)−1
. (A.2)

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Proof of Proposition 1: Starting from the combination of the value matching and smooth pasting conditions
outlined in the proof of Lemma 1, we ﬁnd
(
y∗∗(1− τ)
r − µ − I
)
+K(y∗∗) =
1
λ1
y∗∗(1− τ)
r − µ +
y∗∗
λ1
d
dyt
K(y∗∗)
y∗∗ − I r − µ
1− τ +
r − µ
1− τ K(y
∗∗) =
1
λ1
y∗∗ +
y∗∗
λ1
r − µ
1− τ
d
dy
K(y∗∗) (Rearranging)
λ1 − 1
λ1
y∗∗ − I r − µ
1− τ =
y∗∗
λ1
r − µ
1− τ
d
dy
K(y∗∗)− r − µ
1− τ K(y
∗∗) (Rearranging)
I(y∗∗ − y∗) = y
∗∗y∗
λ1
d
dy
K(y∗∗)− y∗K(y∗∗) (Rearranging and using deﬁnition of y∗)
d
dy
K(y∗∗)− λ1
y∗∗
K(y∗) = λ1I
(
1
y∗
− 1
y∗∗
)
(A.3)
and (A.3) is (9.a). (A.3) a linear ﬁrst order ODE which implies that the solution can be written as
K(y) = Cyλ1 + I(1− λ1
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗
), (A.4)
where C is an integration constant. We use the constraint that V (yt|t < τ2, Subsidy) ≥ V (yt|t < τ1), which implies
that at y∗∗ = y∗ it must be true that K(y∗) = ddyK(y
∗) = 0, which yields
C =
I
λ1 − 1(y
∗)−λ1 . (A.5)
By substituting C from (A.5) back into (A.4) equation (9.b) follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Using arguments outlined in Section 2, we can write W (yt|t ≥ τ2) = Ayλ1t +Byλ2t + wr
for arbitrary constants A and B. We know that limyt→0W (yt|t ≥ τ2) = wr since there is no likelihood that τ1
will be reached at this limit point, and this implies that B = 0. Also, we know that limyt→y∗ W (yt|t ≥ τ2) = 0
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since there is no likelihood that the welfare ﬂow will continue, and this implies that A = −wr
(
1
y∗
)λ1
. Using these,
W (yt|t ≥ τ2) = wr
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
. If we look at the time prior to τ2, we ﬁnd thatW (yt|t < τ2) = A′yλ1t +B′yλ2t . B′
must vanish because limyt→0W (yt|t < τ2) = 0, so the value matching condition and the smooth pasting condition
imply the following system, where y∗∗ is the solution:
A′y∗∗λ1 =
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗) (Value matching VM)
=
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− I
λ1 − 1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
− I
(
1− y
∗∗
y∗
λ1
λ1 − 1
)
(Using K(y∗∗))
λ1A
′y∗∗λ1−1 =
d
dy
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
(Smooth pasting)
= −λ1w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
− λ1
λ1 − 1I
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
+
λ1
λ1 − 1
I
y∗
, (Using K(y∗∗))
A′y∗∗λ1 = −w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
− I
λ1 − 1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
+
I
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗
(Rearranging SM)
w
r
− w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
− I 1
λ1 − 1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
− I + I λ1
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗
= −w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
− I 1
λ1 − 1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
+ I
1
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗
(Combining VM, SP)
w
rI
= 1− y
∗∗
y∗
(A.6)
We ﬁnd that the right hand side is never greater than 1, so if the left hand side is greater than 1 it is optimal
to oﬀer the subsidy immediately, i.e. y∗∗ = 0. If the left hand side is greater than 1, there is a unique solution.
Consequently,
y∗∗ = y∗max
(
0, 1− w
rI
)
, (A.7)
which yields (11). 
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Proof of Proposition 3: The ﬁrst part is obvious from (11): dy
∗∗
dy∗ =
(
1− wrI
)
> 0 for wrI < 1. The second part
can be evaluated by evaluating the derivative dW (y
∗∗(y∗))
dy∗ =
∂W
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂y∗ +
∂W
∂y∗ . We ﬁnd that
∂y∗∗
∂y∗ =
(
1− wrI
)
and that
∂W
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂y∗
= −λ1
(
w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
)
1− wrI
y∗
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1
+ λ1
I
λ1 − 1
1− wrI
y∗
(A.8)
∂W
∂y∗
= λ1
(
w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
)
y∗∗
y∗2
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1
− λ1 I
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗2
(A.9)
Adding (A.8) and (A.9), we ﬁnd
∂W
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂y∗
+
∂W
∂y∗
= −λ1
(
w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
)
1− wrI
y∗
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1
+ λ1
I
λ1 − 1
1− wrI
y∗
+ λ1
(
w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
)
y∗∗
y∗2
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1
− λ1 I
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗2
((A.8) plus (A.9))
= λ1
(
w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
)(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1 ( 1
y∗
− 1− w/rI
y∗
)
− λ1 I
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗
(
1
y∗
− 1− w/rI
y∗
)
(A.10)
Since y∗∗ = y∗(1− w/rI), we ﬁnd that 1y∗ = 1−w/rIy∗∗ , so it follows that dW (y
∗∗(y∗))
dy∗ =
∂W
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂y∗ +
∂W
∂y∗ = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4: The value of the option to oﬀer subsidy at time t, conditional on the all-time-high
earnings level y¯t can now be written as Ay
λ1
t for some constant A. At the optimal time of subsidy, this value
smooth pastes into the welfare of the investment subsidy (1−G(yt|y¯t))
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)−K(y∗∗)). Adding the
value matching condition, we ﬁnd
Ay∗∗λ1 = (1−G(y∗∗|y¯t))w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗), (A.11)
λ1Ay
∗∗(λ1−1) = − g(y
∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
− λ1w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
− d
dy
K(y∗∗) (A.12)
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When the winning bid is known it must be the case that y¯t = y
∗∗ and G(y∗∗|y¯t) = 0. Using this fact, and combining
(A.10) and (A.11), we ﬁnd
Ay∗∗λ1 =
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗) (From (A.11))
Ay∗∗λ1 = −y
∗∗
λ1
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
− w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
− y
∗∗
λ1
d
dy
K(y∗∗)
((A.12) multiplied by y
∗∗
λ1
)
Since the left hand side is the same in both expressions the right hand side is also the same, which implies the
following relationship:
w
r
+
y∗∗
λ1
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
= K(y∗∗)− y
∗∗
λ1
d
dy
K(y∗∗) (A.13)
From Proposition 2 we know that ddyK(y
∗∗)− λ1y∗∗K(y∗∗) = λ1I
(
1
y∗ − 1y∗∗
)
. Multiplying both sides of this expres-
sion by y
∗∗
λ1
and rearranging we ﬁnd y
∗∗
λ1
d
dyK(y
∗∗)−K(y∗∗) = I
(
1− y∗∗y∗
)
. Since the preemption risk in the market
for subsidy will not aﬀect the subsidy itself at the time it is paid, the right hand side in (A.12) equals I
(
1− y∗∗y∗
)
. 
Proof of Proposition 5: The value of the option to oﬀer subsidy at time t, conditional on the all-time-
high earnings level y¯t can now be written as Ay
λ1
t for some constant A. At the optimal time of subsidy, this
value smooth pastes into the welfare of the investment subsidy (1 − G(yt|y¯t))
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)−K(y∗∗)) +
aG(yt|y¯t))wr
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
. We ﬁnd, therefore, the following two conditions:
Ay∗∗λ1 = (1−G(y∗∗|y¯t))
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
+ aG(y∗∗|y¯t))w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
, (A.14)
λ1Ay
∗∗(λ1−1) = − g(y
∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
− λ1w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
− d
dy
K(y∗∗)
+ a
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− aG(y∗∗|y¯t)λ1w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
, (A.15)
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When the winning bid is known the conditional probability G(y∗∗|y¯t) = 0, so taking this into account and combining
(A.13) and (A.14), we ﬁnd
Ay∗∗λ1 =
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗) (From (A.14))
Ay∗∗λ1 = −y
∗∗
λ1
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗) (1− a)
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
+
y∗∗
λ1
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)K(y
∗∗)− w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
− y
∗∗
λ1
d
dy
K(y∗∗) ((A.15) multiplied by y
∗∗
λ1
)
Since the left hand side is the same in both expressions the right hand side is also the same, which implies the
following relationship:
w
r
+
y∗∗
λ1
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗) (1− a)
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− y
∗∗
λ1
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)K(y
∗∗) = K(y∗∗)− y
∗∗
λ1
d
dy
K(y∗∗) (A.16)
From Proposition 2 we know that ddyK(y
∗∗)− λ1y∗∗K(y∗∗) = λ1I
(
1
y∗ − 1y∗∗
)
. Multiplying both sides of this expression
by y
∗∗
λ1
we ﬁnd y
∗∗
λ1
d
dyK(y
∗∗)−K(y∗∗) = I
(
1− y∗∗y∗
)
. Since the preemption risk in the market for subsidy will not
aﬀect the subsidy itself at the time it is paid, the right hand side in (A.12) equals I
(
1− y∗∗y∗
)
, yielding equation
(18). If the preemption risk leads to a delay in the timing of subsidy beyond the point where the subsidy is optimally
timed with no preemption risk at all, there must exist a¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that the left hand side in (A.12) equals wr ,
and the value of y∗∗ is then determined as in Proposition 3 by y∗∗ = y∗(1−w/rI). Therefore, we are looking for a
solution to the equation
(1− a¯)w
r
(
1−
(
1− w
rI
)λ1)−K (y∗ (1− w
rI
))
= 0 (A.17)
We show that such value always exists for any 0 < wrI < 1 and we can then verify that the solution in (19) solves
(A.17). We know that if a subsidy is oﬀered the welfare eﬀect of the subsidy, wr
(
1− (1− wrI )λ1), is greater than
the cost of the subsidy K(y∗∗), therefore, the equation in (A.17) must always have a solution 0 ≤ a¯ ≤ 1. 
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Proof of Lemma 2: The welfare of the option to oﬀer subsidy can be written as Ayλ1t where the coeﬃcient A
is determined at the optimal point of subsidy Ay∗∗λ1 = W (y∗∗), such that A = W (y∗∗)
(
1
y∗∗
)λ1
. The following is
given in the text and in Proposition 2 and 3, and unless y∗∗ = 0 we need to assume that wrI < 1.
W (y∗∗) =
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗) (A.18.a)
K(y∗∗) =
I
λ1 − 1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
+ I
(
1− y
∗∗
y∗
λ1
λ1 − 1
)
(A.18.b)
y∗∗ = y∗
(
1− w
rI
)
(A.18.c)
y∗ =
I
1− τ (r − µ)
λ1
λ1 − 1 (A.18.c)
Solving for the constant A from above, we ﬁnd the eﬀect on welfare from changes in w and I by evaluating
d
dwAy
λ1 = λ1
dA
dw and dAy
λ1 = λ1
dA
dI and the sign is obviously determined by
dA
dw and
dA
dI . The constant A is given
by
Ay∗∗λ1 =
w
r
(
1−
(
1− w
rI
)λ1)− I
λ1 − 1
(
1− w
rI
)λ1 − I (1− (1− w
rI
) λ1
λ1 − 1
)
(Value matching)
=
I
λ1 − 1
(
1− w
rI
)
−
(
w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
)(
1− w
rI
)λ1
(Rearranging)
A =
(
I
λ1 − 1
(
1− w
rI
)
−
(
w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
)(
1− w
rI
)λ1)( 1
y∗∗
)λ1
(Dividing by y∗∗λ1)
A =
(
I
λ1 − 1
(
1− w
rI
)1−λ1 − (w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
))(
I
1− τ (r − µ)
λ1
λ1 − 1
)−λ1
(Using (A.18.c-d))
The result follows directly. 
Proof of Proposition 6: First we evaluate dAdw and we show that the welfare is increasing in w by demonstrating
that dAdw > 0. Direct diﬀerentiation yields
dA
dw
=
(
I
1− τ (r − µ)
λ1
λ1 − 1
)−λ1 1
r
((
1− w
rI
)−λ1 − 1)
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The sign of the ﬁrst bracket is positive, and the sign of the second bracket is also positive since λ1 > 0 and
0 < wrI < 1.
Next we evaluate dAdI and we show that the welfare is decreasing in I by demonstrating that
dA
dI < 0. Direct
diﬀerentiation yields
dA
dI
= (1− λ1)I−λ1
(
1
λ1 − 1
(
1− w
rI
)−λ1 − ( 1
λ1 − 1 +
w
rI
))(
1− τ
r − µ
λ1 − 1
λ1
)λ1
+ I1−λ1
(
1− λ1
λ1 − 1
(
1− w
rI
)−λ1 ( w
rI2
)
+
w
rI2
)(
1− τ
r − µ
λ1 − 1
λ1
)λ1
=
1− λ1
y∗λ1
(
1
λ1 − 1
(
1− w
rI
)1−λ1 − ( 1
λ1 − 1 +
w
rI
))
+
w/rI
y∗λ1
(
1−
(
1− w
rI
)−λ1)(1− τ
r − µ
λ1 − 1
λ1
)λ1
(A.19)
The sign of the ﬁrst term of (A.19) is determined by the sign of 1 − λ1 which is negative. The sign of the second
term is negative since 0 < wrI < 1 and λ1 > 0. The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 7: The expression for Ayλ1t follows from the same smooth pasting problem as in Proposition
6 so the only thing we need to be concerned with is the impact on y∗∗ from a change in hF . Diﬀerentiating Ayλ1t
with respect to hF , therefore, yields
dAyλ1t
dhF
= − λ1
y∗∗
Ayλ1t
dy∗∗
dhF
= − λ1
y∗∗
Ayλ1t
(
1− w
rI
) dy∗
dhF
(A.21)
Since y∗∗ = y∗
(
1− wrI
)
we ﬁnd dy
∗∗
dhF
=
(
1− wrI
)
dy∗
dhF
. Using the expression for y∗ given in the text (this is derived
in Lambrecht and Perraudin (2001)), we ﬁnd that the optimality condition for y∗ is given by
y∗(λ1 − 1 + y∗hF )− I
1− τ (r − µ)(λ1 − y
∗hF ) = 0 (A.22)
47
Taking the total diﬀerential with respect to y∗ and hF on both sides of (A.22), dividing by dhF and isolating the
expression dy
∗
dhF
we ﬁnd
dy∗
dhF
= −y∗ y
∗ + I1−τ (r − µ)
λ1 − 1 + 2y∗hF + I1−τ (r − µ)hF
< 0 (A.23)
Hence,
dAy
λ1
t
dhF
> 0. 
Proof of Proposition 8: The optimality conditions which leads to the welfare of the subsidy option Ayλ1t to
smooth paste into the welfare of the subsidy at y∗∗, are given by
Ay∗∗λ1 = (1−G(y∗∗|y¯t))
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
+ aG(y∗∗|y¯t)w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− bG(y∗∗|y¯t)K(y∗∗) (A.24.a)
λ1Ay
∗∗(λ1−1) = − g(y
∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
− w
r
λ1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
− d
dy
K(y∗∗)
+ a
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− b g(y
∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)K(y
∗∗)
− aG(y∗∗|y¯t)λ1w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
− bG(y∗∗|y¯t) d
dy
K(y∗∗) (A.24.b)
Combining (A.24.a) and (A.24.b), and setting G(y∗∗|y¯t) = 0, we ﬁnd the condition for the optimal stopping time
y∗∗, which implies the condition:
w
r
−K(y∗∗) + y
∗∗
λ1
d
dy
K(y∗∗) = −hG y
∗∗
λ1
(
(1− a)w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− (1− b)K(y∗∗)
)
(A.25)
Substituting in b = a−a¯1−a¯ into (A.25), the right hand side vanishes. Recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that the
optimal stopping time y∗∗ satisﬁes
w
r
−K(y∗∗) + y
∗∗
λ1
d
dy
K(y∗∗) = 0 (A.26)
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which is identical to (A.25) when b = a−a¯1−a¯ , hence the result follows from Proposition 2. It remains to show that
WS(y
∗∗) = WN (y∗∗). The welfare of a subsidising country at y∗∗ is WS(y∗∗) and the welfare of a non-subsidising
country at y∗∗ is WN (y∗∗). We ﬁnd that
WS(y
∗∗) =
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗) (A.27.a)
WN (y
∗∗) = a
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− bK(y∗∗) (A.27.b)
Assume a tax b = a−a¯1−a¯ . Recall from the deﬁnition of a¯ that (1− a¯)wr
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
= K(y∗∗). Then we ﬁnd that
WS(y
∗∗)−WN (y∗∗) = (1− a)w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− (1− b)K(y∗∗)
= (1− a)w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− 1− a
1− a¯K(y
∗∗) (using deﬁnition of b)
= (1− a)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
− w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1))
(using expression for (1− a¯))
= 0 (A.28)
The result follows. 
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